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bone(49), ehe pare essere giunto alla conclusione ehe, pur esistendo tra gli hutu
ed i tutsi, una differenziazione m qualche modo ascnvibile ad una specificità
etnica pur temperata storicamente da una forte osmosi, ciô non avrebbe do-
vuto necessariamente comportare il conflitto. Al contrario si sarebbe potuti ap-
prodare — corne del resto era stato in epoca precoloniale — a forme di pacifica
cooperazione e convivenza se solo la pratica amministrativa perseguita dalle po-
tenze coloniali (quella tedesca prima e poi la belga) non avesse fatto assumere
alla differenziazione etnica quella coloritura di contrapposizione ideologica e
politica certificata poi degenerata verso forme di conflitto assoluto.
Abbiamo accennato a corne l'africanistica italiana si sia nel corso degli ul-
timi decenni caratterizzata anche per un sempre più intenso rapporto di colla-
borazione tra i settori délia storia e dell'antropologia. Ciô è awenuto in sintonia
con quel processo di awicinamento tra le due discipline ehe ha portato alla de-
finizione dell'antropologia storica e dell'etnostoria corne nuovi campi in cui si
sono venute concentrando le rispettive competenze. Si sono cosi avuti contri-
bua in cui acquisizioni prodotte da ricerche di tipo antropologico si sono in-
crociate con indagini di tipo propriamente storico (50). Un ambito ove la simbiosi
tra la ricerca storica ed antropologica si è fatta più stringente e promettente è
stato quelle concernente i gruppi akan delTAfrka occidentale. Lo studio inter-
disciplinare dell'insieme akan nella dimensione délia "lunga durata", filtrata at-
traverso la persistenza délia loro identité culturale, ha permesso l'awio di un
approccio di ricerca ehe dovrebbe fornire una piena rappresentazione dell'og-
gettiva continuità délia vicenda storica di quelle popolazioni riconducendo
l'esperienza coloniale alla dimensione di un semplice "passaggio". È questo
l'obiettivo ehe ha mosso un gruppo di studiosi italiani, animato in particolare
sul versante storico dal sopra ricordato Valsecchi e su quello antropologico da
Fabio Viti, e ehe ha già prodotto concreti e apprezzabili risultati (51).
Da questa traccia, pur tra le tante preannunciate omissioni, e a sua con-
clusione, dovrebbe risultare corne la storiografia africanistica italiana — am-
pliando il suo raggio d'intéressé, affinando le proprie metodologie e riparando
ad anacronistici ritardi — sia giunta a far sï ehe oggi l'immagine dell'Africa.
"vista dall'Italia" (per riprendere il titolo del presente convegno) sia più ade-
rente alla realtà di quanto non lo sia stata sino a non molti anni or sono.
MARCO LENCI
(49) Basti qui i] rimando al recente C CAKBONE, Burundi Congo Rwanda Storia con-
temporanea di naziom, etme, statt, Roma, 2000.
(50) Esemplare in tal senso, oltre al numéro dedicato al coloniahsmo italiano in En-
trea délia rivista "Quaderni Stonci" già citato alla nota n. 38, A BELLAGAMBA, Ricordati di
ten Stona e stone m una regtone del Gambia, Torino, 2000.
(51) Cfr. P VALSECCHI - F Vm (a cura di), Mondes Akan /Akan Worlds. Identité et
pouvoir en Afrique occidentale / Identtty and Power m West A/ma, Pangi, 1999 e l'eccellente
monografia P. VALSECCHI, I stgnon di Appoloma Poten e formazione dello Stato m Africa oc-
cidentale fra XVI e XVIII secolo, Roma, 2002.
"" BADME AND THE ETHIO-ERITREAN BORDER:
THE CHALLENGE OF DEMARCATION IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD
Introduction
The Ethiopian-Eritrean 'border war' of 1998-2000 ended almost three years
ago. This conflict was about much more than a stretch of relatively useless
borderland, but in thé subséquent negotiations this issue bas corne to dominate
thé agenda. While a UN mission is in place and has not met with serious problems
in keeping thé former belligerents apart, the border is still not demarcated. As
evident from recent studies on the historical roots of the problem (Guazzini 1999,
Ciampi 2001), the very idea of making a border between these two closely related
countries will remain controversial, and the physical delineation itself will be
fraught with problems.
In the Spring of 2003, a year after the publication of a Border Décision
prepared by a commission at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague,
there were signs of increasing tension. Eritrea claimed ".. .that peace with Ethiopia
is 'unravelling' and accused Addis Ababa of 'sabotaging' Implementation of an
independent border ruling" (')• After many delays and disagreements, the process
of actual démarcation (the 'pillar emplacement') was poised to start in July 2003,
but in reverse order: not in the west, as originally planned, but in the east. The
reason this seemed obvious: the situation on the western border is highly
contentieus, despite the April 2002 ruling of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Border
Commission (EEBC), and has become the issue of a prestige battle between the
two countries. lts focus is the village of Badme. This place — its correct spelling
would rather be Badimme — was a major war zone and is now seen as a highly
symbolic prize. No one knew for sure what country would be accorded the place
until the EEBC gave a statement on 21 March 2003 on the controversy and
rebuking Ethiopian scepticism. In it, the EEBC finally declared that Badme would
be in Eritrea (2). However, the case is not closed yet with this statement. Ethiopia
remains unconvinced and has called for a more realist and 'proper' interprétation
of the issue in the spirit of the December 2000 Algiers agreement.
The actual démarcation is now anticipated with trépidation by both sides.
Badme is the place where it all began on 6 May with an armed incident between
Eritrean and Ethiopian militia, followed by a violent incursion on 12 May 1998 by
Eritrean troops to revenge the killing of some of their soldiers and of a high-
ranking officer by Ethiopians. The Eritreans displaced the local Ethiopian
administration and town militia and occupied the place (3).
(1) See: http://www.irinnewsorg/frontpageasp?SelectRegion=Horn_of_Africa, a news
message of 5 March 2003.
(2) See: http://pca-cpa.org/PDF/Obs.EEBC.pdf for the text.
(3) See, for instance, the news dispatch by Rosalind Russell: "Ethiopia says unprepared foi
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What ensued is history: one of the most intense and bloody wars that Africa
bas seen in récent years, with an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 deaths. It ended in
a military defeat for Eritrea in May-June 2000 after a remarkable Ethiopian
offensive, a peace negotiation agreement in December 2000 (the 'Algiers
Agreement'), the installation of a 4200-member UN peacekeeping force (UNMEE)
in early 2001, and thé création of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission,
appointed and mandated by both enemies and working under thé auspices of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague (4).
The EEBC gave its 125-page verdict on 13 April 2002 (5) and thé two
contestants had said beforehand that this décision would be taken as binding.
While both countries in 2002 predictably claimed the ruling as a 'victory' (6), thé
first différences of opinion were already evident a few days after thé EEBC décision
came out and hâve continued until this day. The primary flash point is the location
of Badme, allegedly the f ons et origo of the conflict. It was the first battleground
and became thé linchpin of national integrity on both sides. It will be recalled that
president Isayas Afeworqi of Eritrea had said, after the conquest of the place in
May 1998, that giving up Badme would be like saying that thé sun would set in thé
east, and he claimed it had always belonged to Eritrea. For Ethiopia it was a
humiliation that a place administered by them since its founding was usurped by
Eritrea with force.
Badme thus became highly symbolic place, and whoever would be accorded
it under thé EEBC décision would carry thé day and be perceived as thé ultimate
victor of thé war. This may be thé reason why thé EEBC, in a radier stränge move,
excluded any référence to thé location of Badme in its lengthy report. It is only
mentioned once in passing (on p. 84). On thé detailed maps in thé Border Ruling,
the Commission even refrained from indicating Badme. Its coordinates were not
given either. This was delaying thé truth and therefore a fruitless gesture. In
addition, by neglecting to discuss Badme and thé local situation as perceived by
the people living on thé spot, thé EEBC also dispensed with an important
jurisprudential convention (to which we will corne back below). Meanwhile, the
propaganda battle between Ethiopia and Eritrea has gone on(7), both claiming
Badme and thus being thé moral victor of the war.
Eritrean invasion", 13 June 1998 (Reuters) The literature on the conflict is now quite extensive.
See, for instance, Abbink 1998, Battera 2001, Gillces & Flaut 1999, Paulos 1999, Brüne &
Heinrich 1999, and Negash and Tronvoll 2000.
(4) A Claims Commission was also installed to deal with claims for war damage and lost,
stolen or destroyed property.
(5) Available on the PCA website: http://pca-cpa.org/PDF/EEBC/EEBC%20-%20
Text%20of%20Decision.htm.
(6) An Internet search in February 2003 yielded at least 4400 items dealing with 'Badme',
most of them news items and mainly propagandistic comments from both sides, often in
preposterous nationalist language.
(7) See: 'Border ruling vindicates Eritrea, Asmara says,' IRIN news message 14 April 2002;
and 'Mêles hails ruling of international court as victory of law over aggression', at
www.telecom.net.et/-ena/Newsenglish/87010.1504.htm, accessed 20 January 2003. The Prime
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Where is Badme, and what does it matter?
In focusing too much on thé whereabouts of Badme in thé final border
démarcation exercise, it is easy to lose sight of thé real issues of thé war, which to
most observers was quite senseless. Thèse issues were a combination of personal
arrogance of two régimes (and leaders) with authoritarian tendencies, political
indecisiveness (especially on thé part of Ethiopia), and thé lack of clear-cut,
statesman-like agreements on thé mutual politico-économie relations of the two
new states after 1991, when thé two leaders came to power with a momentum of
hope and promise (cf. Abbink 1998).
Mêles Zenawi, Ethiopia's prime minister and thé leader of the former
insurgent movement Tigray Peoples' Liberation Front (TPLF), in power in Addis
Ababa since May 1991 after thé defeat of thé Mengistu-regime, was long thé close
ally of Isayas Afeworqi, who was leader of the guerrilla movement EPLF that took
Asmara in 1991. They had a closely allied political agenda, inspired by Marxist
policies dating from thé 1970s Ethiopian student movement. Their movements,
thé Eritrean Peoples' Liberation Front (EPLF) and the TPLF (later EPKDF or
Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Démocratie Front), also had had close military
coopération in the field. EPLF had helped found and train the TPLF in the mid-
1970s.
Relations between the Eritrean and Ethiopian regimes, however, turned sour
in 1997 when rivalry emerged on regional hegemony, and when Eritrean president
Isayas saw he could no longer dominate Ethiopian policy in all respects. Tensions
rose, economie and political problems escalated, and Isayas gambled to restore
dominance by forcing the Ethiopians on the border issue, similar to what he did
with Yemen in the case of the Hanish Islands (8). The border conflict is therefore
to be seen as a means(9) used to achieve wider ends: regional dominance,
maintaining privileged economie relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and
weakening of the Ethiopian regime, which was then in the midst of serious
political problems and opposition from large sections of the public. Isayas
gambled wrongly, as Mêles, under gréât pressure from his party and the Tigray
home base — hard hit by the invasion — as well as the wider public, did not de-
escalate and had to respond by force. In February 1999, Eritrean forces were
dislodged from Badme in a big Ethiopian offensive that cost of several tens of
thousandsoflives.
Minister did not mention Badme in this message. An Ethiopian official statement of 13 April
2002 saying that Ethiopia had received ".. .sovereignty over Badme" and " all areas in the Badme
région" is incorrect or at least premature because it did not provide any évidence supporting
this view (see: www.waltainfo.com/Boundary/Ethio_Eritrea/Boundary/Latest_Statement.htm,
accessed 17 July 2002).
(8) I.e., first occupation, then negotiation. The International Court of Justice subsequently
ruled that Hanish was Yemeni territory.
(9) And a rather insignificant one at that, because the outstanding border issues were
being negotiated between them in a bilateral Border Committee since November 1997.
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Badme is a village in the land of the Kunama, the ancient indigenous people
in the area. It took its name from the Badumma plains, a stretch of land used
mainly as pasture by the Kunama and more recendy as cultivation area(10). The
village of Badme was founded in the 1950s under the auspices of the then
administrator of the Tigray province, Ras Seyoum Mengesha, who was killed in
the 1960 coup d'état attempt in Ethiopia. Over the years, Eritrean farmers and
traders also came to settle in Badme. They were of the same language group
(Tigrinya) as the local people. As Eritrea was then federated with Ethiopia, any
border problem did not arise (n).
One big confusion has to be cleared up first and may hold the key to the
solution of where the place is. On most maps there is a place called Yirga, which
seems to coincide with the location of Badme. Yirga's géographie location is 14°
37' 60N latitude - 37° 55' OE longitude (12). In a news dispatch of 12 July 1999, an
AFP reporter noted that local people spoke of 'Badme' when they meant the village
formally named 'Yirga' (13). In official Ethiopian documents, however, Badme is
the name of a place in the woreda (or district) of Tahtay-Adiabo. In the Ethiopian
census report of 1994 there is no mention of a town called Yirga but only of
Badme, which confirms the idea that Badme and Yirga are one and the same. This
would answer the question of where exactly Badme is, because under all
projections and treaty lines Yirga, with the mentioned coordinates, is securely in
Ethiopian territory, some 20 kilomètres north of Shiraro town on the road to
Eritrea (see, e.g., the populär Michelin road map of Northeast Africa and the map
in the Macmillan Atlas). Also on the first map on the border area issued by the UN
in September 2000 (Map no. 4150 Rev. l, subsequently withdrawn from the
UNMEE web site) (14), Yirga is located in Ethiopian territory. There has, however,
been a word play going on by both Eritrea and Ethiopia on 'Badme', because it
can refer both to the village and to the Badme or Badumma plain extending across
(10) At least some 14,000 ha. of fertile land is available. See the report on Tigray Region
on: www.sas.upenn.edu/MricanJ->tudies/Homet/nrthl210.htrn, p. 8.
(11) The border between Ethiopia and the Italian colony of Eritrea was never delineated,
let alone demarcated. However, on the basis of actual présence and administration (tax records,
civil services, etc.) by a government and its nationals, the practical borderline was quite clear.
(12) Source: www.calle.com/world/Ethiopia/Yirga.html. Note that there is no mention of
Badme in this very extensive database while many smaller villages are included.
(13) Life résumés /» Badme, AFP news dispatch of 11 July 1999. See also: Badme and
Zalambessa, in: Addis Tribune, 26 April 2002 (at: http://eri24.com/news889.htm). Here it is
mentioned that Yirga was named after the favourite horse of Ras Seyoum. As confirmed to me
by a local source in Ethiopia, the latter's 'horse name' was indeed 'Aba Yirga'.
A nice but not likely solution to the whole problem might be the confirmation of the
existence of two Badme's, as was creatively suggested in the article 'Border a geographer's
nightmare', on BBC Online, 23 July 1999, (at: www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/ethiopia/99-
07-23 .htm, accessed 11 February2003.
(14) See for a copy: http://www.ethiopiafirst.com/images/UNMEEmapEthiopia-
Eritreaboundary.pdf. It was replaced by map no. 3790, rev. 4, of November 2000, at:
http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/eritrea.pdf, both accessed on 25 April
2003.
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both countries. So 'Badme' in the wider sensé, except for Yirga village, can
legitimately be claimed as being in either country.
There are assertions in various sources that with Global Positioning System
(GPS) reckonings Badme is in Eritrea (see, for instance, Fielding 1999: 93, who
did not visit Ethiopia but only the Eritrean side). This cannot be ascertained as
long as the Yirga-Badme confusion is not sorted out and if the issue is not seen
from both sides of the borderline. Certain is that in the report of the Ethiopian
nation-wide census of 1994, 'Badme town' is listed as a location in Tigray (CSA
1998: 10) and was stated to have 892 inhabitants. In various UN documents,
Badme is also mentioned as an Ethiopian place and as a recipiënt of food aid (").
People of Badme voted in all Ethiopian élections after 1991. Another indication is
that until the moment of the outbreak of war in May 1998, Eritrean currency (the
naqfa, introduced a year earlier) was never in use in Badme, only the Ethiopian
The fighting atound Badme
When Eritrean forces entered the Badme area on 12 May 1998, they neither
were hailed as liberators nor did they behave as such. The nature of Eritrean
military action was offensive and turned into occupation, as it did in the contested
Irob country further to the east. Several Badme civilian résidents were killed and
abducted, and before retreating in the wake of the Ethiopian offensive of February
1999, the Eritrean army largely destroyed the town: the church, the primary
schools, the hand pump, the clinics. Local résidents stated that there were efforts
to forcibly take their land and give it to Eritreans. All this would indicate that
Eritrea had no administrative or other foothold in Badme, and was not recognized
by local people as legitimately having one.
While the issue of the feelings of the Badme résidents is indeed different
from the legal issue of where the border is or should be on the basis of the 'colonial
treaties', what seems sure is that the question of actual possession and peaceful
administration (i.e., effectivités, if not uti possedetis facto, or 'Have what you have
in fact had') was in Ethiopia's favour.
Before 1991, the area around Badme was sometimes in dispute. In the 1970s,
it was the field of opérations of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). This
movement now and then tried to establish administrative structures in the area,
e.g. in Badme, but were resisted by the TPLF (founded in 1974), which saw it as
part of Tigray. The TPLF was supported in this by the emerging EPLF, which
declared at the time that Badme did not belong to Eritrea. In the 1970s the TPLF
had a field base in the village of Bumbet, some 10 kilometers north of Badme. But
after the TPLF and EPLF had combined in chasing out the ELF from the area in
1981, the EPLF gradually shifted to the position that Badme did belong to Eritrea
(15) See www.sas.upenn.edu/Afncan_Studies/EUE/tigray0494.html.
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after all. However, the TPLF and EPLF shelved the issue o£ borders to a later date,
until they would form the government (16).
In the international efforts since May 1998 at negotiating an end to the war
(by the Us-Rwanda mediators, by the OAU, by thé UN), Eritrea was always asked
to pull back from Badme, in line with thé général principle of international law
that border disputes cannot be resolved by resort to force. I.e., before the conflict
Badme was simply not administered by Eritrea.
Badme and thé 'triangle' surrounding it reverted to Ethiopian rule in
Febmary 1999 and have remained under it until today. After the big Ethiopian
offensive of May 2000, which went deep into Eritrean territory, many former
Ethiopian résidents gradually returned to thé village and starled rebuilding their
houses and demining their fields. The Eritrean migrants who had lived there
stayed away.
History and treaties
There is a number of colonial treaties made between Italy (colonizer of
Eritrea since 1890) and Ethiopia dating from thé early 20th Century: the one-page
Italo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1900, thé Italo-Ethiopian-British Treaty (or 'Note') of
1902, and thé Italo-Ethiopian Treaty of 'Convenzione') of 1908 (which relates to
thé eastern border). Thèse treaties or agreements carried annexes with unclear
maps sketching thé rough outlines of thé border. As G. Ciampi — is probably the
best analysis of the historical background of the border issue, based on all the
relevant maps — confirms (17), none of the proposed borders was ever marked on
the ground because final agreement was reached on none of them. He also rightly
remarks (ibid.) that there were probably differing conceptions of the very idea of
'border'. There was gréât ambiguity and confusion on the names of places and
rivers on the maps, some of them occurring more than once. Ciampi's study has
made it clear that even on the early Italian maps of the border région made in the
first decade after the 1900 Treaty there was a great variety of proposed
borderlines. Italy also steadily encroached on Ethiopian soil, and even marked up
maps unilaterally (18), probably in their contacts with the British. But its invasion
of Ethiopia in 1935 automatically made all treaties and unilateral maps null and
void(19).
After the Second World War, Emperor Haile Sellassie confirmed the
(16) For some very interesting background material see: Belai Abbai, 'Ethiopia betrayed',
at www.tisdj.net/ethiopia%betrayed%20-%20partl.pdf. I also thank Mr. Aregawi Berhe, TPLF
leader at the time, for comments on this point.
(17) ClAMPI 2001, p. 15.
(18) Ibtd., p. 182-183.
(19) Another important and well-documented study of the border issue and its historical
antécédents was made by Federica Guazzini (1999a, 1999b).
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invalidity of the previous treaties (20), and Italy renounced them in 1947 with the
Peace Treaty with Ethiopia. Eritrea became a UN Trust territory under Britain in
1942, was federated with Ethiopia in 1952 and in 1962 incorporated as a province,
in a process of questionable legality.
The EEBC now has resurrected the three old treaties. This was done within
the mandate given to it by the two warring countries, as agreed in their December
2000 Algiers Agreement. The Commission did not say anything on the very
question of the légal or other status of these old treaties today. It is important to
realize that the border décision is based on the agreement by Ethiopia and Eritrea
to give the authority to décide to the EEBC and to respect its décision in principle
as 'final and binding'. Also, under this mandate, a number of other legal
considérations and norms were declared irrelevant, even though many are in
theory valid. This scenario was understandable in the light of the political
sensitivities, but it did not guarantee that objective justice was done. Indeed, the
EEBC even said (EEBC 2002: 1) that it "... shall not have the power to make
décisions ex aequo et bono" [= according to what is just and right]... Hence, on at
least two accounts the Committee's work was problematic: 1. it disregarded
political considérations and rivalry that governed state policy in both countries
and might préjudice the outcome of a ruling on its own merit; 2. it neglected legal
principles such as 'self-determination', or even hearing the voice, of local
populations, and that of effectivités, a point on which Ethiopia's case on
Badme/Yirga is quite strong.
Anyway, if the treaties are taken as the base, the 1902 treaty, an amendment
to the unclear 1900 treaty between Emperor Menilik II and the Italians, seems to
be crucial. There the western borderline, from the Mareb to the Setit (or Takkaze)
rivers, is defined as a Une going from the Maiteb-Setit junction up to Mai Ambesa-
Mareb confluence. The EEBC had to décide from the treaties and the submissions
by Ethiopia and Eritrea.
In pre-World War II treaties and documents of both Ethiopia and colonial
Eritrea, the name Badme does not occur, because most of the area in question —
the Badumma plains — was uninhabited and only occasionally used for pasture
by the Kunama people, whose land it is. Apart from some text in the Appendices
of the Border Ruling (pp. 111-115), the EEBC has not seriously considered any
developments after 1935, when conditions in the area changed markedly: first of
all, the Italian Fascist invasion, which by itself annulled any agreements between
Ethiopia and Italy as regards its colony Eritrea, later the Ethio-Eritrean
fédération of 1952-62, the highly contested inclusion of Eritrea into Ethiopia,
and the subséquent settlement and economie activities in the border areas.
Omitting to assess the post-1935, and specifically the post-1941 situation, is a
mistake.
1952.
(20) See Order no. 6, in the Ethiopian state gazette, "Negarit Gazeta", 11 September
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The Eebc Décision and thé western border: where has Badme gone?
After the EEBC Décision was published, Ethiopia's foreign minister in a press
conference on 13 April 2000 said that Badme was awarded to Ethiopia. This was
contested by Eritrea the next day, and indeed the ruling does not give any concrete
évidence that it was, and neither country specified where Badme was located.
What does the EEBC Décision actually say?
Remarkable in this ruling is that in the Western Sector it has retained the
old straight border line herween the two rivers Mareb and Setit, from the junction
Mareb-Mai Ambesa in the north to the junction Setit-Tomsa in the south (a bit
west of the Eritrean claim line). Although the Tomsa point is contested, this
straight line is found on most recent maps of the Ethio-Eritrean border, including
the map of provincial boundaries in the 1988 édition of the National Atlas of
Ethiopia (insofar as can be guessed from the scale of the map). However, the three
treaties of 1900,1902 and 1908 did not prescribe a straight Une as the border: they
only indicated it as the provisional Une to be decided upon and demarcated on the
ground later, presumably according to local circumstances, settlement patterns,
land use, etc. This never happened. In the meantime the local people went about
their business not heeding any border, and local administration was estabh'shed.
Thus, the facts on the ground, in the absence of a concrete border being
marked — which anyhow lost much of ks relevance after 1962 when Eritrea was
absorbed by Ethiopia — have eminent relevance to any borderline décision of
today. The EEBC, however, did not think so and just bypassed uti possédées and
effectivité principles, as well as local ideas of national belonging and, in the cases of
the Irob people in the Central Sector and of the Afar people in the Eastern Sector,
self-determination. Obviously, the Commission was restricted by the mandate. In
its Eight Report, it expressed regret over the f act that the newboundary lines might
resuit in new "physical divisions" and "...may adversely affect the interests of the
local inhabitants" (21). But it goes on to say that such things as the division of
communities in such a case "...are by no means unusual" (ibid.).
In their submissions, Ethiopia and Eritrea were at variance about the
location of the line between the small rivers Mai Ambesa and 'Maiteb' (or Meeteb,
or Maieteb). There was no disagreement about the northern Mai Ambesa-Mareb
point, but all the more about the southern point. This reflects the enormous
diversity in the early 20th-century maps (even the Italian ones) on the western
border, especially the location of the Maiteb. In it submission to the EEBC, Eritrea
pretentiously claimed that the 'Maiten' (sic) stream, due east, was the Maieteb of
the 1902 Treaty (see EEBC 2002:14). Ethiopia claimed that the 'real' Maiteb was
located far in the west, about 20 kilomètres east of the town of Umm Hajer. The
names were indeed on the old Italian and other maps (there are at least two,
possibly three, Maitebs or Meetebs, cf. the maps in figures l, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 11 in
(21). See Progrès! Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia. and Entrea, UN (UN,
S/2003/257,6 March 2003, p. 11.
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Ciampi 2001), but both claims were wrong - at least they were never finally
decided upon. Looking at the available maps and the confusion on geographical
names, the question of deciding on where the 'real' Maiteb is located is up to a
certain extent arbitrary. There was thus no compelling logic in the extant
documents for the Commission to follow.
This fact made it all the more important to look at actualities, feelings of
belonging of the local population, effectivités, etc. that evolved in the last fifty years,
especially since the end of Italian occupation in 1941 (The mandate of the EEBC
made this even possible, because the basis for its décisions would not only be the
"pertinent colonial treaties", but also "applicable international law", cf. EEBC 2002,
p. 1). The Commission decided not to do so. It put the southern border point at the
Setit-Tomsa junction, east of the most eastern Maiteb. Remarkably, and for reasons
that are unclear, the Commission took over the Tomsa point from the ItaUans, who
had unilaterally claimed it as definitive in the 193Os, though it was never formally
agreed upon in any treaty between Ethiopia and Italy.
While the Border Décision argued that Ethiopia had not adduced sufficient
évidence on actual possession of Badme and environs, the final border ruling does
not pinpoint Badme anywhere, neither in the text nor on the map. The Décision
casts aside the record of Ethiopian de facto administrative rule and possession of
the territories west of the straight line (indicated on the unofficial map of the
Region of Tigray (22). However, on the basis of what was said above, Badme village
is not included in the area accorded to Eritrea; only a part of the Badumma plains
and the environs of Badme village.
Under the Décision, Eritrea has the advantage of having a questionable
border internationally guaranteed and its precarious national identity reinforced.
Ethiopia, despite having won the war and the battle of prestige, has not gained an
inch of territory, nor any right to the free use of Assab port on the Red Sea. It did
not take advantage of the fact that, historically and legally speaking, the entire
relationship with Eritrea, from borders to port use, was up for negotiation again,
due to the unilatéral resort to armed force by Eritrea. The only thing the
Ethiopians did was to evict the enemy from its uncontested territory. That a war
became 'necessary', however, was partly the result of the Ethiopian regime's
ambiguous and perhaps naive politica! dealings with the Eritrean government and
of giving it too many politica! and economie advantages after 1993.
Ethiopia contested the EEBC décision on 13 May 2002, but this came too late.
It had no miUtary positions any more to back up its borderline claims, and, in any
case, had made insufficient claims in the negotiations themselves. Regarding this
latter issue, it is remarkable that no claim whatsoever was submitted to the EEBC for
an outlet to the sea (Assab port). In paragraphs 4.69-4.71 (p. 50) of the Border
Ruling it is also shown that Ethiopia gave up contested areas Uke Tsorona and Fort
Cadorna without any counter-claim. Apparently, even the claim to Badme came
very late, as par. 5.92 of the Border Ruling shows: "The Commission notes that no
(22) See: www.waltainfo.com/Conflict/BasicFacts/2002/June/fact_01.htm.
228 NOTE E TESTIMONIALE
évidence of such activities [i.e., long-time présence, effective administration, etc. in
thé Badme area] was introduced in thé Ethiopian Mémorial [= thé submission to
thé EEBC] The évidence to be examined only appeared in thé Ethiopian Counter-
Memorial. It was not added to or developed in thé Ethiopian reply".
It seems that Ethiopian policy on this matter followed thé old TPLF
ideological line — or dogma — that Eritrean independence within borders that
were already agreed upon in the late 1970s in covert agreements between EPLF
and TPLF — is to a large extent being carried out (cf. the paper by Bêlai cited in
note 16). This is also testimony to thé fact that thé underlying political alliance
between the two regimes in Addis Ababa and Asmara, despite the insults and the
bloodshed, might still be there, or might be revived. However, thé irony is that
Italy — and Eritrea — never had any exercise of administration or control in thé
Badme area and beyond.
Conclusion: a Cold War in thé Horn of Africa?
It is amazing that such an apparently simple question as to where Badme lies
is so controversial and so bidden in a smoke screen of propaganda and nationalist
talk by the two protagonists. It only shows how deeply this unfortunate conflict
has blighted Ethio-Eritrean relations. It is also amazing how the two regimes were
prepared to let the issues of this disagreement blow up into a devastating war with
huge economie, environmental, and human conséquences.
The wider background of this is probably the familiär fear of losing power
and the ingrained politics of secrecy and distrust in the Horn of Africa, maintained
by elite manoeuvring. There is a long-standing crisis in African political culture,
faced with enduring conditions of resource scarcity, poverty, and zero-sum game
power politics. As in many places in Africa, in the Horn one deals with an insecure
and contested leadership that wants to retain its power at any cost. Compromise
politics, power sharing, or taking into account opposition forces emanating from
the wider society, is seen as a personal defeat by leading elites on both sides.
Among the leading strata in the Horn countries, there also seems to be a
continued insecurity about national identity and the state interest. As long as the
culture of envy and authoritarianism prédominâtes, in the absence of sufficiently
entrenched citizen's interest groups and 'civil society' institutions, there is little
hope for improvement as to democratization, the building of a 'lasting peace',
sustainable economie development and other such fictions. Assessing the new
political landscape in Ethiopia in 1995, Marina Ottaway already remarked that the
conditions for democracy, a proper justice System or balanced development were
not promising (23).
The prédiction is this: if Badme/Yirga village is finally given to Eritrea,
whatever the legal argument made in the highly contestable PCA ruling, there will
continue to be perennial tension between the two countries, with a danger for
(23) Ottaway 1995: 75-76, 81.
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additional violence though not large-scale war. If it remains with Ethiopia, it will
not lead to a normalization of relations between the two countries, but would
reduce to chance for future violent conflagrations. This tension will not be
resolved in the lifespan of the current two regimes and their leadership. At most,
there will be a cold peace (or a cold war). After its rejected appeal to the EEBC of
13 May 2002 (24), Ethiopia — in view of the bad news — has been preparing itself
to défend its position to its population. The Ethiopian government indeed has to
walk a tightrope, because its home base of Tigray can no longer be counted upon.
And if Badme is retained, many other areas have to be ceded, notably in the
Central Sector. The EEBC missed a great opportunity to make face-saving
compromises. Giving Badme/Yirga to Eritrea would be a quite contestable
décision, wholly beyond what the treaties would allow. It would slash away the
legitimacy of the Ethiopian regime among its population to act in the national
interest. For outside observers it is striking to see how weak the Ethiopian
présentation and arguments to the EEBC have been on matters related to the
national territory, all because of a parti-pris towards Eritrean independence within
borders that were defined in an off-hand deal between two insurgent movements
many years ago. The minor territorial 'gains' made by Ethiopia in the Central
Sector (Zalambesa area) will not make any impression on the population, because
these territories were already under Ethiopian administration. There are growing
indications that Ethiopia is regretting the stance it took - it may have been a
historie mistake. The dismay of the Ethiopian leadership came out in the open
during April and May 2003 (25) and there is manoeuvring to influence the actual
démarcation of the border. Ethiopia will also drag its feet as long as possible in
vacating settlements now declared to be in Eritrea (26).
(24) See: http://home.planet.nl/~hans.mebrat/greater-tigray.jpg, accessed 24 February
2003.
(25) See Ethiopia urges Commission to rectify mistakes in Ethio-Eritrea border délimitation
process, at: http://www.waltainfo.com/EnNews/2003/Apr/12Apr03/Aprl2e6.htm, and the IsiN
news message of 16 April 2003, 'Ethiopia: Border Commission accused of 'belittling' calls for
change'. See also "Government won't resort to force over Badme, Minister says", IRIN news
message of 14 April 2003, at http://allafrica.com/stories/200304140349.html
On 2 May 2003 the Ethiopian published a major paper with its comments on thé EEBC
border décision. See: http://www.geocities.com/EthOnlinePublication/CommentsToEEBC.html.
(26) See: IKIN, 'Eritrea-Ethiopia: Ethiopia told to comply with border décision', at:
www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=30850&SelectRegion=Horn_of_Africa. See also the
press release of 24 June 2002 by the EEBC, The Hague, on the PCA website: http://pca-
cpa.org/PDF/EEBC/Decision24June2002.pdf.
At the time of final editing of this paper, the Border Commission accused Ethiopia of
appearing "...to undermine the peace process", because in its comments on the finalized
démarcation map submitted in December 2002 Ethiopia "... went far beyond the scope" of
comments on the map. "The main thrust of the Ethiopian comments is that the boundary should
be varied so as to take better account of human and physical geography." (See the Progress
Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, UN (UN, S/2003/257,6 March 2003, pp.
10-11). See also the ÉUN news report of 10 March 2003 ("Eritrea-Ethiopia: Border commission
accuses Ethiopia of undermining peace").
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Observing Ethiopian-Eritrean relations of the past decade one notes that
'normalization' is not in the cards. There is disunity within the Ethiopian
leadership as to thé course to follow toward Eritrea, which prevents normal
relations, there is a danger of small-scale proxy war being waged, and there is deep
irritation if not hatred between large sections of the Eritrean and Ethiopian
peoples, fuelled by thé appalling abuse of and cruelty towards ordinary citizens in
thé war. In addition, dramatic economie and social problems structurally affect
these countries, not in the least disastrous food insecurity and violent 'ethnie'
conflicts, exacerbated by dubious policy choices. There also have been mounting
domestic problems in the wake of the war. Notably, some Eritreans are beginning
to wonder — in muted voices — whether this kind of independence, with a highly
authoritarian leadership in a stifling surveillance state of militarist signature, was
really worth it(27). The Ethiopian people, and especially those in Tigray, feel
betrayed not only by Eritrea, but — judging from many independent press reports
— also by their own leadership, which has not reaped the benefits of war after its
victory and its shattering of the army of the opponent. In both the domestic field
and international relations, the post-1991 record of both regimes that took over
power from the disastrous Mengistu-regime with such a groundswell of support
and promise, has been a déception in many respects.
From what they say, it seems clear that the inhabitants of Badme/Yirga want
to stay with Ethiopia(28). It is perhaps symptomatic of the dire state of local
politics — this time supported by the legality of a dubious border décision the
constraints of which were set by the Ethiopian and Eritrean regimes — that they
have not been listened to. Unfortunately, the démarcation problems in store will
show, if it still needed showing, that the war has not solved anything.
JON ABBINK
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